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Separatism, Globalization, and the European Union 
By Ross Dayton* 
Introduction 
 
 Globalization is both an integrative and deconstructive process. Globalization integrates 
states and non-state actors into transnational and global networks (Keohane & Nye, 2000, p. 105). 
These networks are based on multiple channels of interdependence that include trade, politics, 
security, environment, and socio-cultural ties (pp. 106-107). Due to advances in 
telecommunications technology, the expansion of globalization “shrinks” the distance between 
peoples (p. 105). On the other hand, globalization can also break up the existing political and social 
order (Mathews, 1997, p. 50). Globalization disperses power and information flows, thus enabling 
local and transnational identity movements to challenge states (pp. 51-52). This can be exemplified 
by separatist movements that seek to break away from central authorities. 
 Separatist movements either seek autonomy within their central states or to establish newly 
independent states. Since 1990, 34 new states have been established (Rosenberg, 2014). Many of 
these states gained their independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
(Rosenberg, 2014). Separatist movements later declared independence in countries such as South 
Sudan, Kosovo, Eritrea, East Timor, and Montenegro (Rosenberg, 2014). Ongoing separatist 
movements throughout the world seek to establish new states, including Kurdistan in the Middle 
East, Tibet and Xinjiang in China, Kashmir in India, Palestine in Israel, Chechnya in Russia, 
Quebec in Canada, and many more.  
Separatist movements are also prominent within the European Union, which now has over 
40 separatist parties (EFA, 2014). The most notable of these movements include Scotland in the 
United Kingdom, Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain, and Flanders in Belgium (Bieri, 
2014, p. 1). Separatism in the European Union seems paradoxical at first; the European Union is 
often regarded as a “post-sovereign” system and possibly a model for globalization (Mathews, 
1997, p. 61). The European Union resulted from the economic and institutional integration of 
European states in the decades following World War II (Jones, 2012). While it is not a state itself, 
the European Union is capable of overriding the national laws and executive decisions of its 
member states (Krasner, 2009, p. 28). Under the European Union, Europe’s economy has been 
integrated into a single market under one currency, the Euro (Jones, 2012). Despite being so highly 
integrated, separatist movements are not only emerging but have the potential to destabilize the 
European Union.  
Separatism in the European Union challenges many assumptions about globalization and 
the international system. On the one hand, it poses a threat to sovereignty and territorial integrity 
in the current Westphalian state system (Connoly, 2013, p. 67). On the other, it challenges the 
notion that globalization is bringing about the demise of the state; the demand for new states is 
increasing, not declining. To understand the rise of separatist movements in the European Union, 
their underlying causes and implications for European policy makers must be analyzed.  
                                                     
*Ross Dayton is a current graduate student in the MA in Global Governance program at Florida 
International University; he graduated from FIU with a BA in International Relations and Political 
Science with a minor in Sociology/Anthropology and certificates in National Security Studies, Latin 
American & Caribbean Studies, and the National Security Studies’ Mentor Program. His areas of interest 
include globalization and security, conflict resolution, terrorism, and diplomacy. He would like to thank 
professor Markus Thiel for his support. 
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Separatist Movements and Identity 
 
Identity often serves as the basis for separatist movements. Identity in separatist 
movements is often based on shared history, culture, language, and social cohesion (Gurr, 2007, 
p. 137). Identity becomes more important to members of a group as it suffers inequality and 
grievances from dominant groups with different identities (p. 138). Regional leaders can then 
frame the political discourse in separatist terms and promote autonomy or secession as a solution 
to collective grievances (p. 137). Based on these identities and grievances, separatists use 
communications technologies and transnational networks to organize political action and attract 
support from diaspora groups and foreign sympathizers (p. 136).  
The role of identity in separatist movements can be seen in the Basque movement in Spain. 
The Basque Country have their own unique language that does not have any relation to Spanish or 
any other language (Macko, 2011, p. 5). Due to their cultural and linguistic differences with Spain, 
the Basques ruled themselves autonomously until the late 19th century (p. 6). Between 1939 and 
1975, Francisco Franco’s dictatorship revoked the Basque Country’s autonomy and violently 
suppressed Basque identity to promote Spanish nationalism (p. 6). Consequently, the Basque 
terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) launched attacks against the Spanish government 
from 1959 until 2011 (p. 4).  
Historical grievances based on cultural and linguistic identities are also fueling separatism 
in Catalonia. Catalan identity and autonomy were also suppressed by the Spanish dictatorship 
(Connoly, 2013, p. 56). Under Franco’s regime, the use of the Catalan language and expression of 
Catalan culture was forbidden (p. 56). Due to memories of repression, cultural and linguistic 
preservation is an important motive for Catalan separatists (Bieri, 2014, p. 2). After Francisco 
Franco died in 1975, Catalan nationalists worked within Spain’s political structure to pursue their 
goals (Connoly, 2013, pp. 56-57). However, the Spanish government has blocked pro-Catalan 
legislation, including defining Catalonia as a nation and giving preference to the Catalan language 
in the region (pp. 57-58). Catalan nationalists wanted to hold a referendum on independence, but 
the Spanish government did not allow it for being unconstitutional (Muro, 2014). In addition, 
Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy is opposed to reforming the Constitution to allow a 
referendum (El País, 2015). Spain’s refusal to let Catalonia vote for independence has further 
alienated Catalans (Muro, 2014). The Catalan regional government held a symbolic referendum 
on November 9th, 2014, in which 80 percent of 2 million voters (out of 5.4 million eligible voters) 
voted in favor of independence (BBC, 2014).  
Historical marginalization by the French speaking population in southern Belgium 
(Wallonia) over the Dutch speaking population of the north (Flanders) has long been a source of 
tension and resentment (Connoly, 2013, p. 63). After Belgium was founded in 1830, economic 
wealth and political power was concentrated in Wallonia (p. 63). French became the dominant 
language for politics, culture, and commerce in Belgium (p. 63). Francophone elites regarded the 
Dutch language as suitable “for domestics and animals” and the Flemish as “uneducated, backward 
peasants, suitable to do manual labour and little else” (p. 63). Under pressure from Flemish 
nationalist movements in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Belgian government gradually 
extended linguistic and cultural rights to Flemish regions (p. 63). As a result, the Flemish and 
Walloon populations are now heavily divided by language, territory, and political and civil 
institutions (p. 63). The Belgian national government is continually growing weaker as more 
authority is devolved to the Flemish and Walloon governments (p. 64). As a consequence of 
political deadlock between Flemish and Walloon parties in parliament, Belgium broke Iraq’s 
record for the longest time without a functioning national government in February 2011 (p. 66). 
Belgium has subsequently been described as “the most successful failed state ever” (p. 62). The 
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LA Times humorously characterized the situation in Belgium as “a (very) civilized war as told by 
Dr. Seuss, with the French-speaking Walloons on one side and the Dutch-speaking Flemings on 
the other” (p. 52).  
Cultural and linguistic identities are not always emphasized by separatist movements.  
While Scotland has distinct cultural and linguistic identities from the rest of the United Kingdom, 
contemporary Scottish separatists did not use identity-based grievances as a cause of separatism 
(King, 2012). Scottish nationalists assured that Scotland would continue to have close cultural ties 
with England after independence (King, 2012). English would still have been the primary language 
and the British Pound would still have been the official currency had Scotland voted for 
independence (King, 2012). Instead of accentuating cultural identity and grievances as a cause for 
independence, the Scottish National Party recently relied on political and social values to rally 
support (King, 2012). Scottish leftists have felt alienated by past conservative governments; 
conservative economic policies under Margaret Thatcher that negatively impacted Scotland have 
pushed its drive towards self-governance (Tharoor, 2014). Scotland has more progressive social 
programs than the rest of the United Kingdom, such as free university tuition and healthcare, that 
they wish to expand (BBC, 2014). Scottish separatists want a state that more closely resembles 
Scandinavian welfare states than the United Kingdom (Bieri, 2014, p. 3). 
 
European Institutions and Separatism 
 
The European Union’s institutions have enabled separatist movements. European 
regionalization has decentralized authority from nation-states to regional governments and 
centralized authority to supranational institutions (Pantovic, 2014, p. 15). This devolution of 
authority gives sub-state regions more autonomy and enables them to pursue their own interests 
over national interests (p. 15). National leaders may find it difficult to satisfy both national and 
regional agendas (p. 15). As regional populations become discontent with their central state’s 
inability to provide for their needs and interests, they are more prone to want greater autonomy or 
even independence (p. 15).  
The European Union’s institutions also makes independence more attractive for sub-state 
regions. Smaller states can have a greater voice in international affairs and access to more financial 
assistance (Pantovic, 2014, p. 16). In addition, smaller states in the European Union face 
significantly less security issues than small states have outside of it (p. 16). EU member-states 
have not gone to war since World War II due to complex interdependence and institutionalization 
(p. 16) (Keohane & Nye, 2012, p. 78). In addition, NATO could continue to provide military 
protection to secessionist regions if they are granted membership in the alliance (Pantovic, 2014, 
p. 16).  
Separatist movements have already benefited from the European Union by creating 
transnational networks through it. Separatist regions, such as Catalonia and Flanders, have 
promoted the spread of their culture and economic relationships with other regions in the EU 
(Connoly, 2013, p. 82). They have established liaison offices and connections with EU officials, 
and created transnational organizations such as the European Free Alliance (EFA), a political party 
in the European Parliament whose membership include many of the progressive separatist parties 
in Europe (p. 81). The EFA’s goal is to “promote the right of self-determination of peoples” in the 
European Union (p. 81). In addition, separatist regions also participate in transnational political 
networks such as the Conference of European Regions with Legislative Powers (REGLEG), in 
which legislative regions across the EU come together for common concerns (p. 81).  
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Economic Causes for Separatism 
 
Globalization has shifted control of the global economy away from national structures 
(Hudson, 2009, p. 432). As multinational corporations gained more transnational freedom, control 
of production and market organization became more concentrated into cities and sub-state regions 
(pp. 432-433). Foreign Policy’s Globalization Index shows that smaller states and regions are 
among the top beneficiaries of globalization (A.T. Kearney and Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2007, p. 72). With few natural resources and limited domestic markets, 
smaller states can attract foreign direct investment to become economically competitive with larger 
states (p. 72). Therefore, the European Union’s open market decreases the costs and increases the 
benefits for stateless nations to seek statehood by facilitating foreign direct investment (Pantovic, 
2014, p. 19). Smaller and wealthier regions like Catalonia and Flanders can make economic gains 
from becoming independent while staying in the EU.  
The European economic crisis is also motivating separatist movements to seek 
independence. In times of economic downturn, wealthier regions will want independence to avoid 
paying for national burdens (Pantovic, 2014, p. 11). Catalonia, for example, is one of the wealthiest 
regions in Spain, but its taxes are collected and redistributed by the Spanish government; the funds 
that were dispersed back to Catalonia are much lower than the taxes that were taken (Connoly, 
2013, p. 58). For every Euro that Catalans pay in taxes to the Spanish government, 57 cents are 
remitted back to Catalonia (Gonzalez & Clotet, 2012; La Vanguardia, 2012). Consequently, the 
Catalan regional government had to ask the Spanish government for loans to pay its debts 
(Gonzalez & Clotet, 2012). To combat Catalonia’s debt, the Spanish government is forcing 
austerity measures on the Catalan government. The Catalan regional government was forced by 
the Spanish government to lower the deficit percentage of its GDP to 1.5 percent, which Moody’s 
Investor Services considers to be unrealistic (Roth, 2012). In addition, the Spanish government did 
not offer any relief to Catalonia after the European Union gave concessions to Spain (Roth, 2012). 
Catalan separatists believe the Spanish government’s tax and austerity policies are holding 
Catalonia’s economy back and cite them as reasons for secession (Connoly, 2013, p. 58).   
 Flemish nationalists want to break up Belgium because they no longer want to 
economically support Wallonia (Connoly, 2013, p. 64). After World War II, the tides changed in 
Belgium and Flanders became one of the wealthiest regions in Europe (p. 64). While 58 percent 
of Belgium’s population is Flemish, Flanders produced over 82 percent of Belgium’s total exports 
in 2012 (Knowledge @ Wharton, 2014). Wallonia, however, went into an industrial decline and 
became increasingly reliant on subsidies from the national government (Connoly, 2013, p. 64). 
Flemish nationalists believe that Walloon government is wasting money and resent having to pay 
for its economic mismanagement (Knowledge @ Wharton, 2014). The Flemish also believe that 
breaking Belgium up would allow the government to lower taxes since they would no longer have 
to subsidize Wallonia (Knowledge @ Wharton, 2014).  
Natural resources may also motivate separatist movements to pursue independence. The 
discovery of oil in the North Sea in the 1970s led to a resurgence in Scottish nationalism (Connoly, 
2013, p. 60). Alex Salmond, the first minister of Scotland and leader of the Scottish Nationalist 
Party, argued that an independent Scotland could make 54 billion Euros in tax revenue from oil by 
2016-2017 (Macalister, 2014). Scottish separatists like Salmond believe that control over 
sovereign oil revenues would make Scotland one of wealthiest countries in the world (Macalister, 
2014). However, others have disputed these claims of wealth (Macalister, 2014). In addition, 
almost all licenses for oil production in the North Sea are owned by foreign companies (Macalister, 
2014). Smaller states with oil often have to accommodate their tax structure to the preferences of 
international oil companies, which would compromise the massive amounts of revenue that 
Scottish separatists promised (Macalister, 2014).  
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International and European Law 
 
Secession challenges two main pillars the Westphalian state system is based on: territorial 
integrity and sovereignty; when a new state is established, the parent state loses control over its 
former territory (Connoly, 2013, p. 67). Secession can lead to the dissolution of the parent state in 
extreme cases, as exemplified by the dissolution of Yugoslavia (p. 67). While the right to self-
determination does exist in international law, it is often discouraged (pp. 67-68). Indeed, the 
current state system would be completely destabilized if every potential claimant to self-
determination pursued it (p. 68). While separatist movements may invoke the right to self-
determination to justify their cause, unilateral declarations of independence are only accepted by 
the international community under certain circumstances, such as colonialism or denial of 
democratic freedoms and human rights (pp. 70-72). Unilateral secession was recognized in the 
case of Kosovo due to human rights abuses from Serbia (p. 72). Negotiated secession, where the 
new state and the parent state agree to secession, is a more viable option for European separatists 
(p. 73).  
Secession also poses legal questions for the European Union. Separatists argue that their 
regions would retain EU membership immediately after negotiated secession (Chamon & Van Der 
Loo, 2014). According to separatists, secession based on constitutional and democratic processes 
is protected by Article 2 of the Treaties on the European Union, which outlines the EU’s core 
values of democracy and rule of law (Chamon & Van Der Loo, 2014). In addition, many separatist 
regions are politically and economically important, so excluding them would be problematic for 
the EU and European integration. These regions are already under EU laws, are part of the 
Eurozone economy, and use the Euro as currency (Connoly, 2013, p. 91). There is also the question 
of what would happen to the capital of the European Union, Brussels, which is located in Flemish 
territory (p. 90). Brussels is officially bilingual, so Wallonia would also try to claim the city as 
their own (p. 90). Brussel’s fate in the event of Belgium’s breakup remains unclear.  
Despite the separatists’ arguments for EU accession, the EU treaties do not specify what 
the membership status of newly independent regional governments would be (Chamon & Van Der 
Loo, 2014). According to the European Commission, new states may have to apply for 
membership to re-enter the European Union under Article 48 or 49 of the Treaty on the European 
Union (Chamon & Van Der Loo, 2014). While accepting the new states would avoid disrupting 
the European Union, many member states may not accept the new states to impede their own 
regions from seeking independence (Chamon & Van Der Loo, 2014). Accession into the EU 
requires the consent of all of its member states, so newly independent states that pursue EU 
membership may be blocked (Lynch, 2014). Several EU members, including Spain, refused to 
recognize Kosovo’s independence in order to not set a precedent for separatist regions in their own 
territories (Connoly, 2013, p. 87). Before Scotland’s referendum, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano 
Rajoy warned that it would take an independent Scotland 8 years to negotiate EU membership 
(Lynch, 2014). Between the EU’s need to prevent disintegration and the desire of member states 
to preserve their sovereignty, the accession of separatist states could potentially create a legal 
quagmire in the European Union. 
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Policy Recommendations 
 
Scotland’s referendum for independence should be used as a model for European states 
with separatist movements (Muro, 2014). The referendum allowed Scotland and the United 
Kingdom to handle the question of independence democratically. Scotland ultimately voted 
against independence with a 55 percent majority because the UK offered to increase autonomy 
(Muro, 2014) (Neuman, 2014). UK Prime Minister David Cameron promises to give Scotland 
more power over its taxes, spending, and social welfare programs (Neuman, 2014). Other 
European states should pursue similar compromises to negotiate independence and autonomy in a 
democratic manner. Polls indicate that voters in Flanders and the Basque Country want more 
autonomy rights but only a minority are in favor of secession (Bieri, 2014, p. 3).  
Support for secession is currently strongest in Catalonia due to the actions of the Spanish 
government. While Spain’s opposition to allowing Catalonia vote on independence is based on 
constitutional law, it is detrimental towards resolving the situation (Muro, 2014). Catalans are 
being alienated by Spain’s unwillingness to negotiate the matter (Muro, 2014). Spain has a 
relatively recent history of civil war, ethnic repression, and terrorism, so it must take steps towards 
a democratic solution if it wants to remain a stable and united country. In addition, secession may 
not be in Catalonia’s best interests if it cannot gain international support for its independence 
(Muro, 2014).  
The Spanish and Catalan governments must negotiate to prevent secession; protection for 
Catalan culture and language must be ensured, and the Catalan government must be given relief 
from over-taxation and austerity policies. The current conservative-led government is unlikely to 
want to make such a compromise, but the conservatives may be replaced by a left-wing 
government in the next elections (Muro, 2014). The rising left-wing party Podemos supports 
Catalonia’s right to self-determination while preferring that Catalonia doesn’t secede (Garcia, 
2014).  While tensions will remain high in the near future, the Catalan dilemma may still be 
resolved in upcoming years (Muro, 2014). 
As political authority in Belgium is continually devolved to Flemish and Walloon 
institutions, Belgium will likely separate into different states over time (Connoly, 2013, p. 66). 
The breakup of Belgium should resemble the breakup of Czechoslovakia (p. 90). In 
Czechoslovakia’s “velvet divorce,” both states agreed to separation and neither the Czech Republic 
nor Slovakia adopted Czechoslovakia’s legal personality in international organizations (p. 90). 
However, the question of Brussels may be a problem for Belgian separation. To prevent any 
conflict between the Flemish and Walloons over the EU capital, Brussels should be made into an 
autonomous capital district like Washington D.C (p. 90). 
If a region and its parent state do agree to secession, then the new state should be accepted 
into the European Union. This would guarantee political and economic continuity for the European 
Union and prevent disintegration. However, newly independent states will have to negotiate with 
opposing member states to attain membership status. In order to avoid any potential quagmires, 
the European Union should work towards creating a formalized pathway towards EU membership 
for seceding states. This pathway should only be available after secession was negotiated with the 
parent member state, and it should ultimately discourage sub-state regions from wanting to secede. 
A possible measure could be to give separatist states only partial membership for a certain period 
of time. Under this partial membership, separatist states would still be part of the Eurozone 
economy and its citizens would still be under EU law, but the states would temporarily not receive 
full benefits and representation. Regardless of how the EU and its member states decide to handle 
to question of separatism, some compromise between transnational integration and territorial 
sovereignty must be made to prevent any potential European fragmentation. 
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